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PANEL I: WHAT IS FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY?
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORIES
GARY LAWSON*

The issue before this panel is one of identification. What epistemologically justifies attaching to an idea or set of ideas the label "feminist legal theory"? In other words, how can one
recognize an example of feminist legal theory if and when one
comes across it?
There are two dangers in this definitional enterprise: demanding too little from feminist legal theorists by way of definition
and demanding too much. The former danger is more apparent,
but the latter is just as serious. There is no reason to expect a
single definition of feminist legal theory to be appropriate for all
purposes and all contexts-no more than there needs to be a
single definition of other important legal concepts. For example,
there are at least six definitions of efficiency that are potentially
relevant for law and economics,' and one could probably find at
least that many definitions of interpretivism in the literature on
constitutional theory.2 'Accordingly, it is no ground for criticism
if self-described feminist legal theorists are not able to agree on a
ingle, canonical definition of their enterprise.3
The possibility that feminist legal theory might have many
valid definitions, however, does not mean that the problem of
* Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. I have benefittedfrom comments
by Cynthia Bowman, Patty Granger, Jane Larson, and Dan Polsby none of whom bears
responsibility for the contents of this article.
1. See Gary S. Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DuKE LJ. 53 (1992) (identifying
six definitions of "social efficiency" in the law and economics context).
2. Indeed, there are at least four plausible definitions of the written document known
as "the Constitution of the United States" that are potentially relevant to constitutional
theory. Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Untoritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107,
114-17 (1989).
3. See Leslie F. Goldstein, Can This MarriageBe Saved? Feminist Public Policy andFeminist
Jurisprude in FFMncsrJuIsPRuDEN E 11, 15 (Leslie F. Goldstein ed. 1992) (noting the
lack of agreement among theorists about the definition of feminist legal theory); Christine A. Littleton, Women s Experience and the Problem of Transition:Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 23, 24 ("[A]ny apparent orthodoxy of shared
definitions is, at best, an illusion."). For a very accessible summary of some of the major
currents in contemporary feminist legal scholarship, see Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal
Scholarship, 77 IowA L REv. 19, 20-29 (1991).
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definition is therefore unimportant.4 On the contrary, the fact
that a term can be used in more than one way enhances the need
to define that term in each context as carefully and precisely as
possible to make sure that the term is used consistently throughout an argument-that is, to avoid the fallacy of equivocation. If
someone makes an argument of the form:
(1) feminist legal theory entails X, and
(2). F endorses feminist legal theory; therefore,
(3) F endorses X,
one needs to be sure that the phrase "feminist legal theory" has
the same meaning in each of the premises. The greater the
number of potentially valid usages of the relevant phrase, the
greater the need to be alert to the danger of equivocation.
My modest task here is to describe, in very abstract terms, some
of the principal classes of definitions for feminist legal theory
that appear in the literature that I have read and in the discussions that I have heard.' Some words of warning are appropriate.
First, I am setting forth classes of definitions. There can be a wide
range of more specific definitions within each class. Second, my
knowledge of self-described feminist legal theory is very limited,
and my categorization may therefore be incomplete-although
the more incomplete my categorization proves to be, the more
important the task of definition becomes. Third, and most importantly, my object here is not to discover the single best definition of feminist legal theory for any given context, but simply to
ensure that chosen definitions are used without equivocation
and with acknowledgement of their presuppositions and
consequences.
One obvious way to define feminist legal theory is by reference
to its subject matter: feminist legal theory is the study of the rela4. Professor Patterson, for example, claims that we can dispense entirely with definitions in this context:
In light of the many projects, aspirations, and theories that can be denominated
"feminist," it makes little sense to advance a definition of feminism. Like all notions, "feminism" has a grammar for its usage; this grammar, however, is contested. Hence, it seems silly to draw lines when no one is entirely reasonable.
Better simply to notice and appreciate the multiplicity of meanings inherent in
the term.
Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law,77 CoRNELL L. Ritv. 254, 256 n.8 (1992).
5. Definitions of feminist legal theory are often only implicit in published works. See
Littleton, supra note 3, at 24 (noting "[t]he range and variety of implicit definitions of
feminism, feminist method and feminist jurisprudence evident in the symposium and
reflected in this volume"). It is possible to assure clarity and avoid equivocation without
explicitly setting forth definitions, but it is difficult.
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tionship between women and the law.6 When stated this starkly,
the definition is independent of both method and viewpoint;
anyone who studies women and the law, in any fashion, is engaged in feminist legal theory. Thus, when Richard Epstein or I
call for the repeal of Title Vii's regulation of private discrimination on the basis of sex,' we are, under this view, engaging in

feminist legal theory. Similarly, if Phyllis Schlafly and Pat
Buchanan call for the overruling of Roe v. Wades or the enactment of a Human Life Amendment to the Constitution, they too
are engaging in feminist legal theory.
This definition is intelligible, functional, and possibly more
prevalent than one might suppose. At two previous public events,
I asked panels composed entirely of self-described feminists
whether they regarded Phyllis Schlafly as a feminist legal theorist,
and the unanimous answer of those panelists who addressed the
question was an unhesitating "Yes." Asking "the Schlafly question" may be a good way to test whether you regard a pure subject-matter definition of feminist legal theory as adequate in a
particular context, keeping in mind that a definition's adequacy
may vary from one context to another.
A variation on this definition, which narrows it somewhat while
still retaining its inclusive scope, limits feminist legal theory to
scholarship that" 'focuses on women, centrally and for their own
sake.' "9 This definition knocks Professor Epstein and myself
from the ranks of feminist legal theorists, but is still broad
enough to require a "yes" answer to "the Schlafly question," and
thus can account for the responses that I have received to that
question from some feminist legal theorists.
A third definition of feminist legal theory, which can be offered instead of or in addition to the first,1" focuses on methodology. In this view, feminist legal theory is, at least in part, the use
of some distinctive analytic method"-much as law and econom6. See Larry Alexander, What We Do, and Why We Do 1 45 STAN. L. REv. 1885, 1889
(1993) ("I will define feminist jurisprudence to include all scholarship that focuses on the
legal system's impact on women and women's impact on the legal system.").
7. SeeRICHARD A. EPsrEIN, FORBIDDEN GRouNDs (1992). I agree generally with Professor
Epstein's conclusions, though not with all of his reasoning.
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a constitutional right to procure abortions).
9. Letter from Jane Larson, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of
Law, to Gary Lawson (May 17, 1994).
10. There can obviously be more than one defining characteristic of a legal theory.
11. Such a definition is at least implicit in a number of important works. See, e.g.,
Kathryn Abrams, Hearingthe Call of Stories, 79 CAI. L REv. 971 (1991); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HAv. L. REv. 829 (1990); Christine A. Littleton, Feminist
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ics can be defined in methodological terms as the systematic ap12
plication of theories of rational choice to legal problems. Of
course, feminists who define their enterprise in whole or in part
in terms of method do not always, and do not have to, agree on
the nature of that method; the "method" approach describes a
class of definitions that can accommodate a large number of
more specific definitions. However, once a particular method (or
set of methods) is put forward as constitutive of the feminist legal
enterprise, one must ask of that method the same questions one
must ask of any method in any discipline: is it coherent, is it
comprehensible, and is it a fruitful tool of inquiry? The answer
to the last question, at least, depends on what it means for a tool
of legal analysis to be "fruitful"-a question that some feminist
scholars have forthrightly addressed.'
Instead of, or in addition to, considerations of subject matter
and method, feminist legal theory might also be defined in terms
of its substantive viewpoint. In the most general sense, one might
define feminist legal theory as that subset of ideas involving women and the law that is concerned with improving the condition
or status of women.' 4 Each important aspect of this kind of definition gives rise to a host of fundamental questions-only some
of which I have seen addressed in the feminist literature.
-Consider first the notion of "concern" (or related terms) for
improving the condition or status of women. Is "concern" something to be determined by reference to intentions or by reference to effects? A way to get at this question is to ask whether a
pro-life activist who genuinely thinks that pro-life policies are
good for women (either adult women, unborn women, or both)
is a feminist legal theorist merely by virtue of that belief, without
regard to whether or not those policies are, by some external
standard, good or bad for women. If the answer is "yes," then
Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN.L. REv. 751 (1989) (reviewing CATHARiNE A. MACIMNNoN, FEMnmSM UNMODIFIED (1987));Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from
the Seraglio:Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination,70 TEx. L. Rav. 109 (1991).
12. See Lawson, supra note 1, at 53 n.1.

13. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 11; Bartlett, supra note 11.
14. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's PRimer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38J. LEGAL. ED. 3, 5
(1988) ("My working definition of 'feminism' is close to Linda Gordon's: 'By feminism I
*
mean an analysis of women's subordination for the purpose of figuring out how to
change it.'" (footnote omitted)); Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. Ctu. LEGAL

F. 115, 116 ("[W]hat does feminism 'in law' mean? I suggest, here too, an inclusive definition: Let us refer to feminist work in litigation, legislation, legal teaching, and legal

theories to advance rights and opportunities for women.").
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feminist legal theory is defined, at least in part, by reference to
the motivations of its practitioners.
Consider now a phrase like "improving the condition or status
of women." By what kind of metric is "condition" or "status"
measured, and how are improvements and retrogressions identified?15 If, for example, the yardstick of "status" is equality between men and women, then what sort of equality is at issue?
Equality in a formal sense or equality in a substantive sense? 16 If
equality is substantive rather than formal, as seems to be the majority view among feminist legal scholars,' 7 then what kind of substantive equality is meant, and is that conception of equality
meaningful? These questions might all have good answers, but
the questions need to be faced and answered forthrightly.
Finally, what is meant by "women"? Does it mean each individual woman, some subset of women, or women as a class?
Although this problem has received considerable attention in the
feminist literature,' 8 it has some interesting methodological and
normative implications that I have not yet seen addressed.
If one means by "women" anything other than individual women, and thus means by an "improvement" in the "condition" of
women anything other than a Pareto improvement across the entire universe of women whereby at least one woman is made better off and none is made worse off,'9 how does one define a
metric of well-being that permits interpersonal comparisons, and
what is the normative basis for trading off gains and losses within
the class? Does feminist legal theory contemplate the use of
some analogue to Kaldor-Hicks analysis?2" Does feminist legal
theory therefore face precisely the same kinds of methodological
problems that plague normative law and economics? And is feminist legal theory worse off, better off, or neither in this respect
15. See Goldstein, supranote 3, at 16 ("[F] eminists disagree even over what constitutes
(i.e., what would count as) the disadvantaging of women.").
16. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. RFy. 803, 803-04
(1990) (noting disagreement about the meaning of equality).
17. See Cain, supranote 3, at 23-24 ("Most feminists in law agree legal constructs have
been created by patriarchal forces that have excluded women. Thus, use of the [formal]
equality theory... necessarily reinforces patriarchal values."). But seeWendy W. Williams,
F. 99 (defending the use of formal equalNotes From aFirst Generation, 1989 U. Cm. .C.UAL
ity as the best jurisprudential understanding of equality for feminist theory).
18. See Bartlett, supra note 11, at 834-35; Minow, supra note 14, at 129-30; see generally
Cain, supranote 3,at 27-29 (describing the debate concerning the proper objects of feminist theory).
19. For a discussion of Pareto improvement, see Lawson, supra note 1, at 85-88.
20. For a discussion of Kaldor-Hicks analysis as it relates to Pareto improvement, see
Lawson, supranote 1, at 89-92.
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than any other normative legal theory? All of these questions are
fruitful subjects of investigation.
A fifth definition of feminist legal theory is seldom stated explicitly but often seems implicit in both written and spoken discussions. Perhaps feminist legal theory can be defined as work
concerning women and the law that reaches a particular set of
concrete normative conclusions on specific policy issues, such as
abortion, affirmative action, etc."' In other words, an article or
idea is an instance of feminist legal theory if it endorses or entails
a set of conclusions that corresponds (with whatever degree of fit
is deemed necessary) to a "checklist" of conclusions that constitute the feminist enterprise. I originally believed that one could
test whether this is really an adequate or operative definition of
feminist legal theory by asking the following questions: Is the
phrase "pro-life feminist" self-contradictory? Is the phrase "antiaffirmative action feminist" self-contradictory? Is the phrase
"anti-Title VII feminist" self-contradictory? And so on. If the answer to some set of such questions is "yes," then one might think
that feminist legal theory is at least partially definable in terms of
some checklist of concrete outcomes. One could generate a similar set of answers, however, by applying some version of the "improving the condition or status of women" thesis that includes a
very specific conception of what constitutes improving the condition or status of women. Thus, even if adherence to a checklist is
an integral part of the feminist enterprise, that does not prove
that such a checklist constitutes the feminist enterprise.
It is silly to think that every article on feminist legal theory
should include a complete set of answers to these questions-just
as it is silly to expect every article on law and economics, interpretivism, or any other legal theory to contain a lengthy essay on
subject matter, goals, and method. But every practitioner of any
theory-be it feminism, law and economics, or interpretivismshould always endeavor to be clear about the definition of his or
her project. That is a minimal criterion of good analysis and
good scholarship.

21. Katharine Bartlett perhaps approaches such a definition when she says that
"[b]eing feminist is a political choice about one's positions on a variety of contestable
social issues." Bartlett, supra note 11, at 833.

